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Affect: A Wrong Turn? 
Affect  Theory,  as  its  advocates  call  it,  has  emerged  as  a  new  research  programme  
in  a  range  of  disciplines  –  cultural  studies,  human  geography,  feminist  theory,  
sociology,  and,  latterly,  anthropology.  The  meaning  of  the  word  ‘affect’  in  this  
new  endeavour  diverges  markedly  from  both  ordinary  and  scientific  usages.  
Drawing  on  the  philosophy  of  Gilles  Deleuze,  and  before  him  Spinoza,  Affect  
Theory  returns  to  the  etymological  roots  of  ‘affect’  in  reconnecting  the  meaning  
of  the  word  as  a  verb  (to  affect,  have  an  effect  on)  and  as  a  noun  (from  the  Latin  
affectus,  ‘affection’,  bodily  affect).  As  geographer  Steve  Pile  puts  it  in  a  useful  
overview,  in  the  new  paradigm,  ‘affect  describ[es]  both  a  capacity  to  be  affected,  
and  to  affect,  and  also  specific  flows  of  affect  that  lie  beyond  cognition’  (2010:  
12).  Writers  in  this  vein  evidently  intend  something  quite  different  from  the  
concept  of  affect  as  understood  in  mainstream  emotion  theory.  What  they  mean  
–  and  what  they  mean  for  anthropology  –  we  shall  come  to.  But  first,  what  of  the  
standard,  semi-­‐technical  usages  in  psychology  and  Anglo-­‐American  philosophy?  
Affect in Psychology and Philosophy 
It  is  encouraging,  and  unusual  in  our  overspecialized  world,  that  emotion  
researchers  in  psychology,  analytic  philosophy,  psycholinguistics,  history,  and  
cognitive  science  talk  to  each  other  and  debate  one  another’s  theories  and  
findings.  A  community  of  interest  has  blossomed  in  international  conferences,  
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learned  societies,  and  thriving  interdisciplinary  journals.  What  has  emerged  
from  decades  of  debate  is  a  broad  field  of  emotion  studies  in  which  participants  
from  the  humanities  and  the  ‘affective  sciences’  speak  a  common  theoretical  
language.  Naturally,  several  of  the  key  terms  are  hotly  contested  –  including  
‘emotion’  itself.  Others  have  a  rather  ad  hoc  designation.  In  particular,  the  usage  
of  ‘affect’  has  been  quite  loose  and  variable,  as  some  examples  will  illustrate.  A  
psychology  textbook  gives  the  following  gloss:  ‘general,  slightly  old-­‐fashioned  
term  used  to  include  emotions,  moods,  and  preferences’  (Oatley,  Keltner  &  
Jenkins  2006:  412).  A  recent  special  issue  of  Emotion  Review  on  ‘affect  
dynamics’  uses  ‘affect’  and  ‘emotion’  interchangeably  (Kuppens  2015).  A  reader  
in  social  psychology  assigns  affect  or  affective  states  to  the  broadest  category  of  
‘emotional  feelings’:  ‘“Affect”  refers  to  any  psychological  state  that  is  felt  and  in  
some  way  is  evaluative  or  valenced  (positive  or  negative).  Indeed,  the  range  of  
phenomena  encompassed  by  the  term  “affect”  includes  not  only  moods,  
emotions,  and  emotional  episodes,  but  also  pleasures,  pains,  likes,  and  dislikes’  
(Parrott  2001:  4).  In  contrast,  the  cognitive  psychologist  Frijda  (1994:  61)  uses  
the  term  more  narrowly  to  refer  to  ‘pleasant  or  unpleasant  feeling’,  a  sense  also  
signalled  in  the  term  ‘experienced  affect’  (Niedenthal  2008).  Likewise,  in  
discussions  of  components  or  dimensions  (two  rival  approaches  to  emotional  
phenomena),  ‘affect’  usually  has  this  narrower  denotation.  Although  the  sense  is  
usually  stipulated  in  context,  the  designation  varies  in  scope.  Inconsistency  has  
made  general  discussion  more  difficult,  leading  Solomon  to  question  ‘the  vague,  
general  (and  technical)  notion  of  “affect”  and  its  cognates  (“affective  tone”)’,  and  
to  wonder  whether  it  merely  substitutes  for  ‘feeling’  (2008:  10).  
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Anthropological  usage  is  similarly  wayward.  Blurring  important  
differences,  the  older  studies  of  socialization  employ  ‘affect’  as  a  synonym  of  
‘feeling’,  ‘emotion’,  and  ‘attitude’  (H.  Geertz  1959;  Harkness  &  Kilbride  1983).  As  
in  psychology,  when  a  narrower  sense  is  intended,  ‘affect’  tends  to  mean  the  
feeling-­‐tone  or  valenced  subjective  response,  the  ‘feeling  good’  or  ‘bad’  about  
something;  as  such,  an  element  in  a  larger  process  of  evaluation  and  action.  Once  
again,  designation  is  usually  clear  from  context;    ambiguity  arises  only  when  
generalizations  are  proposed.  When  Michelle  Rosaldo  claims  that  ‘affects,  
whatever  their  similarities,  are  no  more  similar  than  the  societies  in  which  we  
live’  (1984:  145),  it  is  not  clear  whether  she  is  referring  to  feelings,  emotion  
episodes,  or  vague  mental  states.  The  intention  is  to  defend  cultural  relativism;  
but  to  what  does  it  apply?  
In  a  bibliographic  review  of  ‘language  and  affect’  in  anthropology,  Niko  
Besnier  applied  ‘affect’  inclusively  to  feelings,  emotions,  and  ‘affect,  the  
subjective  states  that  observers  ascribe  to  a  person  on  the  basis  of  the  person’s  
conduct’  (1990:  421).  Besnier  eschews  definitional  concerns  in  order  to  widen  
the  scope  of  enquiry,  a  sound  anthropological  principle.  But  as  Louis  Charland  
notes:  ‘an  important  feature  of  domain  names  of  this  sort  is  that  their  precise  
theoretical  meaning  depends  on  research  in  the  very  fields  they  are  supposed  to  
delimit.  In  the  case  of  ‘affect’  this  has  led  to  an  intriguing  situation  where  both  
the  term  and  the  domain  have  been  called  into  question’  (Charland  2009:  9).  If  
you  want  to  have  your  cake  and  eat  it,  it  helps  to  know  what  counts  as  cake.  
A  central  debate  about  affect  in  emotion  theory  has  hinged  on  how  it  
relates  to  cognition  –  how  it  is  triggered,  how  modified  in  conscious  experience  
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(Clore  &  Ortony  2008,  Scherer  2005).  A  celebrated  mid-­‐century  experiment  by  
Schachter  and  Singer  seemed  to  show  that  both  affect  and  cognition  were  
necessarily  involved  in  fully-­‐fledged  emotion  –  the  ‘two-­‐factor’  theory.  To  
simplify,  a  feeling  of  nervous  agitation  caused  by  an  injection  of  adrenaline  was  
experienced  as  ‘emotion’  only  when  a  motivating  context  was  supplied  to  the  
injectee.  Then  the  disturbance  was  felt  as  anger  (offensive  scenario)  or  joy  
(humorous  scenario)  (see  Cornelius  1996  for  a  review).  Since  then,  and  
notwithstanding  the  continued  catch-­‐all  usage,  the  accumulation  of  evidence  has  
driven  a  trend  towards  a  sharper  distinction  between  affect  as  an  
undifferentiated  process  of  arousal  and  emotion  as,  variously,  a  syndrome  of  
components  (including  affect),  an  Anglo  folk  category  unrecognized  in  other  
traditions,  or  an  emergent  state  that  arises  from  a  combination  of  biological,  
social,  and  cultural  inputs  –  to  name  only  some  of  the  options  (Clore  &  Ortony  
2008).  
Recent  work  on  affect  in  neuroscience  and  cognitive  psychology  is  
difficult  for  non-­‐scientists  to  assess,  although  plenty  have  weighed  in  with  
opinions,  backing  favoured  theorists  like  prizefighters  in  the  ring.  Unlike  the  
bitter  culture  wars  of  the  humanities,  however,  debate  is  increasingly  
collaborative  across  party  lines,  as  shown  by  new  interdisciplinary  journals  like  
Emotion  Review  (I  declare  an  interest  here).  ER’s  founding  editor,  James  Russell,  
himself  sceptical  of  the  scientific  utility  of  the  emotion  concept,  puts  the  case  for  
a  big  tent  approach  to  theoretical  discussion  as  follows:  
  
In  much  the  same  way  that  the  concept  of  thought  is  treated  
by  cognitive  psychologists,  emotion  is  treated  here  as  a  
constitutional  monarch:  The  word  emotion  remains  as  a  name  for  
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the  general  topic  of  discussion  but  is  denied  any  real  power,  such  
as  the  power  to  determine  borders.  Thus  the  scope  of  the  proposed  
framework  [discussed  below]  is  broader  than  emotion  (including  
states  such  as  comfort,  serenity,  drowsiness,  and  lethargy).  Gone  is  
the  assumption  that  all  events  called  emotion  or  fear  or  anger  can  
be  accounted  for  in  the  same  way.  These  concepts  are  not  
abandoned  but  are  put  in  their  proper  place  as  folk  rather  than  as  
scientific  concepts,  and  their  role  limited  to  whatever  role  folk  
concepts  actually  play  in  emotion  (and  in  the  perception  of  
emotion  in  others).  (Russell  2003:  146)  
Boundary  anxieties  are  a  perennial  problem  in  anthropological  discussions  of  
emotion.  How  does  emotion  relate  to  context?  Where  does  affect  belong?  Is  
emotion  different  from  thought?  What  is  essential,  what  peripheral?  So  Russell’s  
strategic  ecumenism  ought  to  work  for  us  too.  It  casts  the  net  wide  and  opens  up  
enquiry  to  the  unexpected,  a  precondition  of  good  fieldwork.  
Perhaps  surprisingly,  and  in  contrast  to  older  theories,  recent  work  in  
cognitive  psychology  leaves  the  anthropologist  considerable  freedom  in  an  
enlarged  field,  gates  thrown  open.  Basic  emotions  theories  like  that  of  Ekman  
had  limited  cultural  variation  to  ‘display  rules’  –  cultural  rules  modifying  facial  
expression  and  what  to  feel.  In  cognitive  approaches,  the  workings  of  the  
nervous  system  are  seen  to  be  in  dynamic  relation  to  situation,  categorization,  
action,  and  felt  experience  –  all  of  which  cry  out  for  ethnographic  attention  
(Barrett  &  Russell  2015;  Parkinson,  Fischer  &  Manstead  2005,  Scherer  2004).  A  
focus  on  components  and  their  contingent  interrelations  therefore  leaves  
everything  to  play  for.  You  might,  for  example,  place  the  emphasis  on  situation  
rather  than  affect  or  category.  Ortony  and  Clore  (2008:  631–632)  argue  that  ‘the  
distinctiveness  of  an  emotion  may  lie  in  the  nature  of  the  situation  it  represents,  
not  in  a  stored  pattern  of  latent  emotional  potential’.  To  which  the  
anthropologist  would  add:  show  me  a  situation  and  I  will  show  you  many  
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emotions,  situation  itself  being  a  construct  depending  on  point  of  view,  
biography  and  ‘narrative’.  
James Russell: Core Affect and 
Psychological Constructionism 
Russell’s  inclusive  approach  to  the  data,  trailed  above,  is  compatible  with  several  
characterizations  of  emotion,  but  it  differs  from  some  in  dealing  not  in  notional  
wholes  like  ‘emotion’  or  ‘emotional  episode’  but  in  more  primitive  building  
blocks.  On  his  account  (but  in  my  non-­‐scientific  words),  ‘core  affect’  is  the  
fluctuating  current  of  feeling  prior  to  cognition  and  action,  the  hum  of  interior  
life,  the  purring  of  the  engine:  ‘Core  affect  is  a  pre-­‐conceptual  primitive  process,  a  
neurophysiological  state,  accessible  to  consciousness  as  a  simple  non-­‐reflective  
feeling:  feeling  good  or  bad,  feeling  lethargic  or  energised.’  (Russell  2009:  1264)  
It  has  two  dimensions,  each  a  continuum:  activation/deactivation  (i.e.  level  of  
arousal)  and  pleasure/displeasure  (i.e.  valence),  corresponding  to  two  
independent  neurophysiological  systems.  What  English  speakers  call  ‘rage’  
corresponds  to  a  state  of  core  affect  high  in  both  arousal  and  displeasure;  
‘depressed’  corresponds  to  low  arousal/high  displeasure;  ‘joy’  to  high  
arousal/high  pleasure;  ‘contented’  to  moderate  pleasure/low  arousal.  As  
challenges  and  opportunities  arise  and  fade,  core  affect  swims  in  and  out  of  
consciousness,  making  itself  felt  with  greater  or  lesser  urgency.  Fear  and  disgust  
might  be  similar  in  intensity  and  unpleasantness,  but  their  subjective  experience  
as  fear  or  disgust  is  the  result  of  a  process  that  unfolds  after  the  alerting  change  
in  core  affect.  In  this  respect,  Russell  follows  William  James.  Relevant  changes  in  
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the  internal  or  external  environment  (a  sudden  memory,  a  strong  coffee,  an  
insult,  a  charging  bull)  activate  a  change  in  core  affect  which  prompts  an  
automatic  search  for  an  object  congruent  with  the  feeling,  a  process  of  
‘attribution’.  One  can  feel  pleasurably  energized  and  attribute  the  feeling  to  an  
achieved  goal  (hence  ‘satisfaction’,  ‘pride’),  a  lover  (‘love’,  ‘lust’),  or  an  event  
(‘excitement’).  One  can  feel  bad  and  attribute  the  feeling  to  a  foe  (‘hate’)  or  
misattribute  it  to  an  innocent  target  (‘Now  look  what  you’ve  made  me  do!’).  The  
cause  need  not  be  the  formal  object.  
The  object  hit  upon  has  an  ‘affective  quality’,  a  propensity  to  affect  the  
subject  that  depends  on  a  range  of  factors,  cultural,  social,  and  biographical.  A  pig  
possesses  different  affective  qualities  for  a  Niha  feastgiver,  a  Muslim,  and  a  child  
hearing  bedtime  stories.  These  affective  qualities  are  not  intrinsic,  but  derive  
from  cultural  values,  social  position,  and  experience.  Without  discussing  them  –  
his  framework  is  strictly  psychological  –  Russell  fully  acknowledges  the  
importance  of  social,  cultural,  and  idiosyncratic  factors  in  emotional  experience.  
They  are  our  entry  point,  the  ethnographer’s  meat  and  drink.  
In  Russell’s  theory,  which  refers  to  ‘psychological  construction’,  words  
like  ‘anger’  and  ‘fear’  denote  concepts  with  associated  scripts  that  are  culturally  
specific.  In  the  process  of  appraisal  of  the  ‘object’  (the  thing  to  which  affect  is  
attributed),  the  subject  categorizes  the  experience  with  a  relevant  concept,  
‘anger’  or  whatever.  This  in  turn  shapes  the  experience.  Feeling  ‘angry’,  I  am  
motivated  to  behave  in  a  certain  way  –  with  aggression,  say.  If  I  categorize  my  
agitation  differently  (thanks  to  upbringing)  as  ‘indignation’,  I  will  respond  
differently.  We  have  seen  how  Utku  and  Javanese,  having  different  emotion  
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concepts,  respond  in  ways  sometimes  puzzling  to  us.  Even  the  dictionary  
equivalents  of  ‘anger’  in  Javanese  and  Niasan  possess  slightly  different  scripts,  
different  models  of  context,  feeling  and  behaviour.  Russell  calls  these  categorized  
experiences  ‘meta-­‐emotions’  –  psychological  constructions  that  correspond  to  
what  emotion  realists  (e.g.  basic  emotions  theorists)  call  ‘emotions’.  Tomkins  
(1984),  for  example,  defines  affects  as  ‘innate  mechanisms’,  but  uses  English  
words  like  ‘terror’  and  ‘contempt’,  which  have  distinctive  cultural  profiles.  In  
Russell’s  terms,  once  Tomkins  applies  such  labels  to  biological  processes,  he  is  
talking  of  meta-­‐emotions.  Meta-­‐emotions  serve  to  organize  subjective  experience  
according  to  cultural  scripts;  they  are  not  natural  kinds.  
The  theory  has  much  more  to  it,  and  the  elaboration  of  the  detail  –  
building  on  half  a  century  of  work  by  an  army  of  researchers  –  is  fascinating,  
though  in  essence  the  framework  is  beautifully  simple  (see  Barrett  &  Russell  
2015  for  the  current  state  of  debate).  The  bald  summary  above  is  directed  by  my  
concerns  and  limited  by  a  layman’s  understanding.  But  it  shows  where  
anthropology  retains  an  interest  and  a  foothold  in  cross-­‐disciplinary  emotion  
research.  It  also  serves  as  a  baseline  from  which  to  assess  the  new  paradigm  of  
Affect  Theory,  which  seems  to  deal  with  some  of  the  same  elements.  
Readers  who  have  followed  the  examples  –  literary  and  ethnographic  –  in  
this  book  will  see  how  closely  they  match  Russell’s  theory.  (And  they  were  not  
pre-­‐cooked  or  retrofitted:  I  have  had  them  in  mind  for  years.)  Such  examples  
also  underline  the  necessity,  at  least  for  the  anthropologist,  of  going  well  beyond  
immediate  situation  (minimally  conceived  in  Russell,  both  in  timespan  and  
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complexity).  So,  let  me  end  this  section  with  a  final  example  from  Tolstoy  –  who  
else?  –  that  descends  from  the  abstract  to  glorious  particulars.  
The  following  scene  from  Anna  Karenina  offers  a  striking  instance  of  the  
interplay  of  core  affect,  unfolding  context,  feeling,  and  meaning  –  all  within  a  
narrative  rich  in  character  and  plot.  The  lovestruck  Levin  –  presented  with  the  
gentlest  irony  as  a  thinker  pitched  into  life,  a  Hamlet  who  says  Yes  –  is  on  his  way  
to  find  Kitty  and  propose  to  her.  The  passage  begins  in  a  manner  Tolstoy’s  
contemporary,  William  James,  would  approve:  ‘At  four  o’clock,  conscious  of  his  
throbbing  heart,  Levin  stepped  out  of  a  hired  sledge.’  (The  Maudes’  translation  
has  the  hyper-­‐Jamesian  ‘feeling  his  heart  beating’.)  Levin’s  agitation  is  increased  
by  the  fact  that  his  proposal  will  come  as  a  surprise  –  more,  in  fact,  than  he  
realizes  –  and  may  be  rejected:  ‘He  walked  along  the  path  toward  the  skating-­‐
ground,  and  kept  saying  to  himself:  “You  mustn’t  be  excited,  you  must  be  calm.  
What’s  the  matter  with  you?  What  do  you  want?  Be  quiet,  stupid,”  he  conjured  
his  heart.  And  the  more  he  tried  to  compose  himself,  the  more  breathless  he  
found  himself.’  (2001/1877:  34)  We  might  call  this  love  compounded  by  hope  
and  fear,  but  would  gain  nothing  by  naming  the  emotions  other  than  pointing  out  
that  within  a  single  sequence,  itself  within  a  larger  emotional  frame  (‘in  love’),  
different,  even  contrary,  emotions  (Russell’s  meta-­‐emotions)  are  intermixed.  
And  then,  in  a  remarkable  passage  that  captures  point  of  view,  affective  
transformation  of  perception,  affective  quality  of  object,  attribution,  and  bodily  
feedback:  ‘He  walked  on  a  few  steps  and  the  skating-­‐ground  lay  open  before  his  
eyes,  and  at  once,  amidst  all  the  skaters,  he  knew  her.  He  knew  she  was  there  by  
the  rapture  and  the  terror  that  seized  on  his  heart.’  (ibid.)  What  Tolstoy  lays  out  
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is  a  unitary  experience  that  comprehends  perception,  all-­‐over  disturbance  (not  
to  limit  it  to  the  body),  feeling,  and  thinking.  To  feel  the  rapture  of  love  is  not  
merely  to  judge  someone  as  loveable  and  feel  accordingly,  as  Solomon  (1993)  
would  have  it,  but  to  see,  feel,  and  know  in  a  certain  way:  ‘for  Levin  she  was  as  
easy  to  find  in  that  crowd  as  a  rose  among  nettles.  Everything  was  made  bright.’  
The  ingredients  of  the  narrative  are  instantly  recognizable:  it  is  a  portrait  
taken  from  life.  But  as  always  with  Tolstoy  the  greater  narrative  context  brings  
to  the  episode  other  dimensions  –  the  contrast  with  the  unhappy  Anna–Vronsky–
Karenin  triangle,  a  sense  of  the  springs  of  life,  the  pivotal  moment  of  self-­‐
discovery,  the  beauty  of  the  ordinary  –  which  is  what  gives  a  simple  human  story,  
fodder  for  many  a  soap  opera,  its  emotional  reach.  The  scene  is  affecting  because  
affect  is  given  its  proper  narrative  place.  
Affect Theory 
How  different  from  all  this  is  the  brave  new  world  of  ‘affect  theory’!  So  different  
that  the  two  bodies  of  thought  hardly  touch,  their  leading  lights  inhabiting  
different  intellectual  spheres.  Which  of  these  spheres,  we  might  wonder,  pertains  
to  our  world?  To  ask  that  question  is  to  assume  a  shared  or  –  at  least  in  principle    
–  shareable  world  that  includes  the  broad  field  of  scholarly  enquiry  and  science.  
But  that  cannot  be  taken  for  granted.  We  come  abruptly  to  a  paradox.  Affect  
theory  draws  freely,  if  haphazardly,  on  biology  and  neuroscience,  but  its  
practitioners  are  not  scientists,  they  are  mostly  unaware  of  –  or  show  no  interest  
in  –  the  range  of  what  I  have  loosely  called  emotion  theory,  and  their  line  of  
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argument  is  often  hostile,  or  at  least  orthogonal,  to  scientific  methods  and  
reasoning.1  
Still,  there  are  points  of  contact.  The  favoured  emotion  scientists  –  among  
the  few  cited  –  are  in  the  Tomkins–Ekman–Izard  tradition  of  biologically-­‐based  
explanation,  of  which  Antonio  Damasio  is  the  current  distinguished  standard-­‐
bearer.  But  affect  theorists  diverge  in  which  biological  systems  they  prefer.  Some  
go  for  the  central  nervous  system  (Massumi  2002);  others  look  for  affect  in  the  
recesses  of  the  brain,  the  endocrine  glands,  or  even  in  the  vapours  of  emotional  
contagion  (Brennan  2004).  The  irony  of  mixing  outré  post-­‐poststructuralist  
rhetoric  with  wide-­‐eyed  scientism  is  inescapable.  It  is  as  if  the  New  Atheists  –  
Dawkins,  Hitchens,  and  Grayling  –  had  adopted  Mother  Teresa  as  their  mascot.  
Why  this  should  be  the  case  is  an  interesting  byway  of  intellectual  history.  
In  their  parallel  reviews,  Papoulis  and  Callard  (2010)  and  Leys  (2011)  argue  that  
the  movement’s  proponents  found  the  separation  of  affect  from  cognition  
espoused  by  basic  emotions  theorists  convenient  to  their  larger  project,  which  is  
to  recognize  and  celebrate  the  bodily  energies  that  escape  intention,  meaning,  
consciousness,  and  therefore  ideology.  The  mind  imprisons;  the  body  liberates.  
So  how  should  we  grasp  this  other  mode  of  being  moved?  Here’s  how  the  
historian  Ruth  Leys  characterizes  the  field:  ‘For  the  theorists  in  question,  affects  
are  “inhuman,”  “pre-­‐subjective,”  “visceral”  forces  and  intensities  that  influence  
                                                            
1  Good  discussions  can  be  found  in  Hemmings  (2005),  Leys  (2011),  Pile  
(2010),  and  Wetherell  (2012).  Leys’  critique  –  which  gives  more  importance  
than  I  would  to  ‘basic  emotions’  theory  as  the  ‘dominant  paradigm’  in  emotion  
theory  generally  (2011:  437)  –  includes  a  painstaking  demolition  of  Massumi’s  
influential  speculative  reading  of  neuroscience.  Gregg  &  Seigworth  (2010)  offers  
a  representative  sample  of  writing.  
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our  thinking  and  judgments  but  are  separate  from  these  …  affects  must  be  
noncognitive,  corporeal  processes  or  states’  (2011:  437).  Pre-­‐,  in-­‐,  non-­‐:  easier  to  
say  what  affects  are  not  than  what  they  are,  or  where  they  are.  But  the  general  
aim  is  clear  enough:  to  get  away  from  individuating,  conscious,  interior,  verbally  
articulated,  and  culturally  formulated  emotions  to  something  prior.  Affect  is  an  
inchoate  energy  that  emerges  from  the  body,  or  is  generated  between  bodies  by  
contagion  or  collision.  Hence  the  link  –  never  satisfactorily  explained,  but  implied  
by  the  double  meaning  –  between  affect  as  sensation  or  energy  and  affect  as  
‘capacity  to  affect  or  be  affected’.  Out  of  mind,  affect  eludes  representation  and  
manipulation.  Once  verbalised,  tamed  or  domesticated,  it  runs  out  of  steam  and  
becomes  something  else.  As  Leys  points  out,  this  characterization  of  affect  is  not  
altogether  different  from  what  certain  emotion  theorists  have  argued  and  
demonstrated  experimentally;  though  it  is  much  closer  to  Russell’s  ‘core  affect’  
than  to  Tomkins  or  Ekman,  whose  fixation  is  on  the  face.  
What  chiefly  distinguishes  new-­‐style  affect  theory  from  old-­‐style  affective  
sciences,  however,  is  the  grander  agenda,  which  is  to  reshape  cultural  and  social  
theory  rather  than  merely  understand  human  functioning.  Like  ‘embodiment’  
before  it,  affect  theory  aspires  to  paradigm  status,  a  new  broom  that  will  sweep  
away  the  cobwebs.  And  behind  the  urgent  ‘theorizing’  burns  a  hunger  for  
something  new:  a  millenial  vision  that  will  overthrow  the  tyranny  of  language  
and  banish  the  old  warhorses  of  positive  science,  social  constructionism  (the  
very  words  sound  tired),  deconstructionism,  and  humanism.  
As  commentators  note,  affect  theory  frequently  gets  drafted  into  an  
emancipatory  agenda,  as  in  the  work  of  the  literary/queer  theorist  Eve  Kosofsky  
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Sedgwick  for  whom  the  determinism  of  social  constructionism  is  a  strait-­‐jacket  
to  be  cast  off.  Without  evidence  of  follow-­‐through,  however,  one  is  hard  pressed  
to  know  what  an  affect-­‐powered  reformist  project  would  entail.  ‘The  goal  is  a  
kind  of  “emotional  liberty”  …  a  politics  of  hope’,  wrote  Nigel  Thrift  (2004:  68)  –  
not  yet  the  powerful  university  vice-­‐chancellor  he  was  to  become.  In  a  more  
playful  mood,  affect  theory  brings  an  air  of  celebration,  a  delirious  flouting  of  
grammar  and  logic  akin  to  the  surrealists’  automatic  writing.  There  is  fun  to  be  
had,  but  also  nuggets  of  insight.  
On  the  whole,  though,  the  preferred  manner  is  oracular  and  declamatory.  
The  editor  of  a  volume  called  The  Affective  Turn  introduces  the  central  concept  
as  follows:  ‘Affect  constitutes  a  nonlinear  complexity  out  of  which  the  narration  
of  conscious  states  such  as  emotion  are  subtracted,  but  always  with  “a  never-­‐to-­‐
be-­‐conscious  autonomic  remainder”’  (Clough  2007:  2).  What  are  we  to  make  of  
this?  Does  affect  constitute  anything?  Who  is  the  narrator?  Does  the  arithmetic  of  
subtraction  and  remainders  add  up?  When  a  film  theorist  (quoted  in  Leys  2011:  
442)  declares  that  affect  is  a  ‘non-­‐conscious  experience  of  intensity;  a  moment  of  
unstructured  potential’,  it  sounds  vaguely  like  Russell’s  core  affect;  but  where  
Russell  stipulates  meaning,  here  the  terms  remain  undefined.  
One  persistent  side-­‐effect  of  the  evasive  manner  is  to  distract  attention  
away  from  concepts,  arguments,  and  evidence  onto  the  words  themselves.  
Definitional  logorrhea  is  symptomatic,  as  if  the  need  to  communicate  overflows  
the  ability  to  formulate.  Content  is  smothered  in  style:  
  
Affect  arises  in  the  midst  of  in-­‐between-­‐ness:  in  the  capacity  to  act  
and  be  acted  upon.  Affect  is  an  impingement  or  extrusion  of  a  
momentary  or  sometimes  more  sustained  state  of  relation  as  well  
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as  the  passage  (and  the  duration  of  passage)  of  forces  or  
intensities.  That  is,  affect  is  found  in  the  intensities  that  pass  body  
to  body  (human,  non-­‐human,  part-­‐body,  and  otherwise),  in  those  
resonances  that  circulate  about,  between  and  sometimes  stick  to  
bodies  and  worlds,  and  in  the  very  passages  or  variations  between  
those  resonances  themselves  …  Affect  is  persistent  proof  of  a  
body’s  never  less  than  ongoing  immersion  in  and  among  the  
world’s  obstinacies  and  rhythms,  its  refusals  as  much  as  its  
invitations.  Affect  is  in  many  ways  synonymous  with  force  or  
forces  of  encounter  …  affect  need  not  be  especially  forceful  
(although  sometimes,  as  in  the  psychoanalytic  study  of  trauma,  it  
is.)  In  fact,  it  is  quite  likely  that  affect  more  often  transpires  within  
and  across  the  the  subtlest  shuttling  intensities:  all  the  miniscule  
or  molecular  events  of  the  unnoticed.  The  ordinary  and  its  extra-­‐.  
Affect  is  born  in  in-­‐between-­‐ness  and  resides  as  accumulative  
beside-­‐ness.  Affect  can  be  understood  as…  
(Seigworth  and  Gregg  2010:  1–2;  not  my  italics)  
What  comes  to  mind  is  Louis  Armstrong’s  witty,  if  unfair,  putdown  of  bebop  –  
‘one  long  search  for  the  right  note’.  (As  a  Monk  fan,  I  protest.)  But  the  quoted  
passage,  in  its  dizzy  effervescence,  seems  closer  to  glossolalia  than  to  Dizzy  
Gillespie:  a  speaking  in  tongues,  a  vivid  instance  of  the  phenomenon  it  seeks  in  
vain  to  define.  In  the  Great  Repentence,  Niha  penitents  broke  into  streams  of  
affect-­‐laden  God-­‐speech  when  they  could  not  say  what  they  meant.  No  one  could  
doubt  their  sincerity,  but  no  one  could  understand.  
Sympathetic  critics,  anxious  not  to  be  wallflowers  or  intimidated  by  the  
intellectual  heavies  standing  in  the  wings,  strain  to  understand  and  incorporate.  
Mostly  they  back  off,  letting  quotations  speak  for  themselves.  ‘When  quoting  
Massumi’,  writes  Margaret  Wetherell  of  a  key  figure,  ‘it  is  almost  impossible  to  
stop.  His  words  are  so  evocative  and  dizzying.  What  he  is  suggesting  is  so  vague,  
breathless  and  escaping’  (2012:  56).  As  long  as  you  stay  inside  the  terminology,  
the  incantatory  repetitions  have  a  self-­‐confirming,  hypnotic  effect.  And  there  are  
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many  tangled  tendrils  and  backstories  that  complicate  interpretation  and  
provide  cover.  Easier  to  dig  up  a  root  than  a  rhizome.  
Rather  than  get  sucked  into  the  infinite  regress  of  who-­‐meant-­‐what-­‐
about-­‐whom,  in  this  chapter  I  am  concerned  with  what  affect  theory  can  offer  
anthropology,  whether  it  overlaps  with  or  supersedes  big  tent  emotion  theory,  
and  whether  it  is  adaptable  to  ethnography  in  both  senses  of  the  word,  the  
fieldwork  and  the  writing.  
How  best  to  approach  the  task?  The  fizzing  diversity  of  the  affect  
enterprise  is  part  of  its  appeal;  but  its  disparateness  makes  it  hard  to  engage.  In  
earlier  chapters  I  developed  a  narrative  approach  to  emotion  through  a  
discussion  of  what  academic  managers  (irritatingly)  call  ‘best  practice’,  with  
some  negative  examples  thrown  in.  Without  a  cohesive  ‘affect  theory’  to  unpack,  
it  makes  even  more  sense  to  structure  a  critique  around  discussion  of  a  few  
exemplars,  which  I  shall  now  do.  My  points  could  be  applied  to  affect  theorists  
more  widely;  but  a  general  discussion  would  quickly  get  lost.  The  strongest  
critique  will  be  one  that  deals  in  depth  with  the  best  representatives.  
I  begin  with  an  example  that  conveys  the  breathless  plethoric  style  and  
thesauric  overkill  of  the  new  school  before  moving  on  to  a  more  straightforward  
work  of  anthropology,  one  that  draws  on  affect  theory  but  that  departs  from  the  
house  style  while  offering  challenges  to  conventional  thinking  on  emotion,  
ethnography,  and  much  else.  
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Ordinary Affects 
Reviews  and  commentaries  encourage  us  to  read  Kathleen  Stewart’s  book  as  a  
pioneering  work,  flagbearer  for  a  new  paradigm  (Blackman  &  Venn  2010,  Martin  
2013,  White  2017).  ‘The  appearance  of  Ordinary  Affects  augurs  well  for  new  and  
productive  forms  of  ethnographic  enquiry  and  cultural  study,’  wrote  one  
reviewer  in  American  Ethnologist  (Staples  2008).  ‘It  pushes  ethnography  to  the  
brink  and  beyond,  scoring  high  in  poetics  and  resonant  voice’,  says  another  
(Krause  2010).  ‘Affect  theory  is  emerging  as  a,  if  not  the,  dominant  mode  of  
critical  discourse  in  the  humanities  and  social  sciences  …  Stewart’s  Ordinary  
Affects  serves  as  a  paradigmatic  example  of  this  re-­‐emergent  field’:  thus,  a  
contributor  to  Feminist  Theory  (Warner  2009).  Evidently,  affect  theory  is  an  
important,  boundary-­‐bursting  venture,  and  –  for  the  anthropologist  –  Ordinary  
Affects  is  as  good  a  place  as  any  to  see  what  it  is  all  about.  
 
                  So  what  is  it  about?  To  misquote  an  old  song:    
What  is  this  thing  called  affect?    
Just  who  can  solve  its  mys-­‐ter-­‐ee?    
Why  should  it  make  a  fool  of  me?    
  
Sometimes  affect  is  very  like  emotion,  or  feelings  available  to  emotion:    
Free-­‐floating  affects  lodge  in  the  surface  tensions  of  low-­‐level  stress,  loneliness,  
dread,  yearning,  a  sense  of  innocence,  backed  up  anger,  the  ins  and  outs  of  love.  
  Stewart  2007:  94      
  
The  imprecision  of  the  sentence—can  something  lodge  in  a  tension?  does 
loneliness  have  a  surface  tension?  –  signals  the  oblique  approach,  an  effort  to  
capture  the  inchoate.  You  could  paraphrase:  ‘vague  feelings  and  background  
moods  find  expression,  or  objects,  in  yearning,  dread,  etc.’.  But  that  would  
presuppose  an  affect/feeling  equivalence,  and  ‘feel’  –  something  quite  concrete,  a  
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conceptual  and  linguistic  universal  (Wierbicka  1999)  –  would  commit  to  a  
different  kind  of  argument.  Stewart  is  not  sure  what  she  means  by  affect,  so  she  
circles  round  it,  evoking  it  in  short  scenes.  A  keyword  in  this  evocation  is  
‘something’.  Affect  is  something,  perhaps  something  happening.  ‘For  some,  the  
everyday  is  a  process  of  going  on  until  something  happens,  and  then  back  to  the  
going  on’  (10).  ‘Everyday  life  is  a  life  on  the  level  of  surging  affects,  impacts  
suffered  or  barely  avoided.  It  takes  everything  we  have.  But  it  also  spawns  a  
series  of  little  somethings  dreamed  up  in  the  course  of  things’  (9).  As  a  
sympathetic  critic  notes,  ‘“Or  something”  does  a  lot  of  critical  work  in  Stewart’s  
project’  (Vogel  2009:  257).  
‘Somethings’  are  different  from  ‘things’.  Things  just  are,  whereas  
somethings  happen  or  surge,  just  like  affects.  ‘Something  surges  into  view  like  a  
snapped  live  wire’  (9).  (Do  wires  snap?  Do  they  surge  into  view?)  Everyday  life  
contains  the  potential  of  something  happening,  hence  ‘the  ongoing  vibrancy  of  
the  ordinary’  (21).  However,  ‘the  ongoing’  is  different  from  ‘the  going  on’,  which  
is  not  vibrant  until  something  happens.  Daily  life  is  quivery,  and  you  never  know  
what  may  happen  next.  ‘Matter  can  shimmer  with  undetermined  potential  and  
the  weight  of  received  meaning’  (23).  We  have  to  be  alert  to  this  potential:  
‘Things  happen!  Here’s  something  that  might  be  for  you!  It’s  the  paying  attention  
that  matters  –  a  kind  of  attention  immersed  in  the  forms  of  the  ordinary  but  
noticing  things  too’  (27).  Here  things  seem  very  like  somethings.  But  this  paying  
attention  permits  insights,  such  as  when  the  author  comes  upon  people  floating  
in  a  hotel  pool:  ‘A  fantasy  tentacle  floating  in  the  stormy  placidity  of  the  nowhere  
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of  dully  compelling  force  peppered  by  dreams  of  getting  out  or  something’  (24,  
original  emphasis).  
As  the  image  reveals,  we  are  at  several  removes  from  standard  
academese,  and  not  too  close  to  the  world  described:  the  reader  struggles  to  see  
past  the  words  to  the  reality  conjured.  To  be  sure,  the  language  is  intended  to  be  
performative,  evocative,  not  analytic  or  discursive.  But  if  the  action  is  happening  
on  the  page,  not  in  the  field,  the  proper  response  –  at  least  the  initial  response  –  
must  be  aesthetic.  
What,  then,  are  the  hallmarks  of  the  house  style?  Like  the  fantasy  tentacle,  
the  tone  hovers  between  the  vaguely  powerful  and  the  powerfully  vague.  As  is  
standard  among  affect  theorists,  nouns  are  mercilessly  pluralized  (‘banalities’,  
‘knowledges’,  ‘somethings’)  –  probably  justifiable  with  reference  to  Deleuze’s  
multiplicities  and  connections.  Lists  of  plurals  proliferate:  ‘Little  undulations  are  
felt  as  pleasures  and  warning  signs,  as  intoxications  and  repetitions  in  daily  
routine’  (28).  Social  science  abstractions  alternate  with  concrete  observations  
and  vignettes  of  the  kind  endorsed  by  creative  writing  tutors.  
  
Sentences  are  short.  
Often  one  to  a  line.  
A  kind  of  pseudo-­‐  
Poetry  
Verbs  are  imprecise:  ‘Ideologies  happen.  Power  snaps  into  place  …  Identities  
take  place.  Ways  of  knowing  become  habitual  at  the  drop  of  a  hat.  But  it’s  
ordinary  affects  that  give  things  the  quality  of  a  something  to  inhabit  and  
animate.’  (15)  
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The  pathetic  fallacy  rules,  partly  a  matter  of  projection  (shimmering  
reality,  bubbling  with  potential),  partly  of  metaphor,  usually  mixed  metaphor.  
‘The  animate  surface  of  ordinary  affects  rests  its  laurels  in  the  banality  of  built  
environments  and  corporate  clichés.’  (29)  Do  affects  have  surfaces?  Do  surfaces  
have  laurels?  Do  they  rest  their  laurels  (a  non-­‐corporate  cliché  that)?  The  prose  
is  less  a  window  onto  a  world  than  a  verbal  vision,  a  hallucination  of  disturbed  
objects  and  prepositions  that  recalls  the  effect  of  magic  mushrooms:  ‘Weirdly  
collective  sensibilities  seem  to  pulse  in  plain  sight.’  (28)  But  the  idioms  –  wires  
sparking,  charges,  circuits,  forces,  ‘vibratory  motion,  or  resonance’  –  are  from  
Popular  Electronics  magazine,  not  The  Doors  psychedelia:  ‘The  potential  stored  
in  ordinary  things  is  a  network  of  transfers  and  relays.’  (21)  If  Stewart  could  
specify  what  these  networks,  forces,  and  relays  were,  that  really  might  be  
something.  
Sometimes  it  all  comes  together  –  the  ordinary,  the  energy  flows,  the  
plurals,  the  potential,  the  random  lists,  the  pathetic  fallacy,  the  choppy  sentences  
and  cod-­‐verse:  
The ordinary throws itself together out of forms, flows, powers, pleasures, 
encounters, distractions, drudgery, denials, practical solutions, shape-shifting 
forms of violence, daydreams, and opportunities lost or found. 
      Or it falters, fails. 
      But either way we feel its pull. 29 
A  quotation  from  Alphonso  Lingis  comes  from  the  same  manual:    
  
Trust  is  a  break,  a  cut  in  the  extending  map  of  certainties  and  probabilities.  The  
force  that  breaks  with  the  cohesions  of  doubts  and  deliberations  is  an  upsurge,  a  
birth,  a  commencement.  (Lingis,  quoted  Stewart  2007:  119).  
What  of  the  vignettes,  the  scraps  of  jargon-­‐tormented  life  served  up  as  
ethnography?  The  scenes  of  lower  class  small-­‐town  America,  of  pallid  epiphanies  
in  postindustrial  suburbs,  seem  familiar  even  if  you  have  never  been  there.  The  
20 
theme  of  something  (mostly  not)  happening,  or  trying  to  make  something  
happen,  was  that  of  the  great  short-­‐story  writer  Raymond  Carver  in  his  sparse  
depictions  of  drab  simmering  suburbia  –  done  to  death  by  legions  of  imitators.  
‘Everything  left  unframed  by  the  stories  of  what  makes  a  life  pulses  at  the  edges  
of  things’,  writes  Stewart,  in  a  kind  of  echo  (44).  But  Carver  famously  had  a  
ruthless  editor,  deft  with  the  scissors.  
                Something  very  strange  has  happened  on  the  way  to  the  mall.  
 
Like a live wire, the subject channels what’s going on around it in the process 
of its own self-composition. Formed by the coagulation of intensities, 
surfaces, sensations, perceptions, and expressions, it’s a thing composed of 
encounters and the spaces and events it traverses or inhabits. 
     Things happen. The self moves to react, often pulling itself someplace it 
didn’t exactly intend to go. (Stewart 2007: 79) 
Even  from  these  short  extracts  it’s  plain  that  the  prose  offers  something  new;  it  
incarnates  what  the  other  affect  theorists  merely  promise.  You  have  to  admire  
the  author’s  pluck.  
Can  we  run  with  it?  There  are  various  ways  of  evaluating  a  new  concept.  
Does  it  illuminate  an  episode?  Or  suggest  new  and  interesting  questions?  How  
does  it  link  up  with  other  explanatory  concepts?  In  a  brief  sketch  Stewart  tells  of  
a  remembered  scene  in  a  doctor’s  waiting  room  in  Virginia.  The  men  awaiting  
the  doc  are  striking  miners.  They  exude  defeat.  But  one  man  spins  a  fantasy  of  
their  storming  the  governor’s  mansion  and  looting  it,  briefly  drawing  in  the  
others.  What’s  going  on?      
a  live  event  –  a  fleeting  conduit  between  the  lived  and  the  potential  hidden  in  it  
(or  hidden  from  it).  Potentiality  resonates  in  the  scene.  It’s  an  experiment  
compelled  by  the  drag  of  affect  in  the  room,  and  when  it’s  over  the  men  just  sit  
calmly  together,  as  if  something  has  happened.  (98)    
  
We  note  the  skimpy  unobserved  context,  the  omission  of  dialogue  (though  it  was  
a  verbal  fantasy),  the  lack  of  evidence  for  the  men’s  interest  or  for  the  ‘drag  of  
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affect’  that  ‘compelled’  the  event.  ‘Event’  is  meant  here  in  the  Deleuzian  sense  of  
‘the  potential  immanent  within  a  particular  confluence  of  forces’,  a  kind  of  vital  
happening  (Parr  2005,  sv.  event).  But  what  practically,  ethnographically,  is  
conveyed  by  this  formula?  How  would  it  be  different,  you  wonder,  if  someone  
had  merely  cracked  a  joke  at  the  company’s  expense?  That  too  would  have  
dispelled  the  gloom.  
  
                  And  yet  something  strikes  a  faint  chord  in  ethnographic  memory:  
  
Ordinary  affect  is  a  surging,  a  rubbing,  a  connection  of  some  kind  
that  has  an  impact.  It’s  transpersonal  or  prepersonal  –  not  about  
one  person’s  feelings  becoming  another’s  but  about  bodies  literally  
affecting  one  another  and  generating  intensities:  human  bodies,  
discursive  bodies,  bodies  of  thought,  bodies  of  water.  (128)  
It  could  be  a  description  of  the  Great  Repentance  in  colonial  Nias  when  converts  
crowded  into  huts  to  jump,  shiver  or  shake,  surrendering  to  trance  (Beatty  
2012).  The  affects  were  not  ordinary  –  far  from  it  –  but  affect  in  Stewart’s  and  
Deleuze’s  protean  sense  does  seem  to  apply.  I  think,  too,  of  Massumi’s  (2002)  
characterization  of  affect  as  the  bodily  autonomous,  the  non-­‐discursive,  the  out-­‐
of-­‐mind.  The  Niha  penitents  were  out  of  time,  out  of  their  minds.  In  Chapter  2,  I  
situated  the  Repentance  among  key  emotions  (‘resentment’,  ‘spite’,  
weltschmerz)  and  cultural  forms  (the  speaking  heart).  But  the  sacred  symptoms  
–  glossolalia,  contagion,  compulsion  –  were  not  limited  to  ‘emotional’  episodes.  
The  rebounding  energy  of  the  movement  burst  its  channels  and  could  not  be  
expressed,  much  less  captured,  by  formulaic  emotions  or  articulated  forms.  
Something  else  was  happening  (there,  it’s  catching!):  a  breaching  of  barriers  
between  past  and  present,  self  and  other,  conscious  and  unconscious,  word  and  
feeling.  
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Can  a  single  word  do  for  all  this?  ‘Affect’,  a  label  for  too  many  processes,  
mystifies  as  much  as  it  explains.  If  the  energy  transmitted  between  Niha  
penitents  was  ‘transpersonal’  (so,  too,  is  much  emotion),  that  is  because  the  
event,  the  choreography  –  the  method  in  the  divine  madness  –  made  it  so.  More  
things  were  in  play  than  agitated  bodies:  traditions  trashed  and  recomposed,  
cultural  models  reinvented,  pop-­‐up  evangelists,  oracles  for  outcomes.  More  was  
surrendered  than  individual  autonomy  and  selfhood.  The  timing,  periodicity,  and  
strength  of  the  movement  –  its  ebb  and  flow  –  were  geared  to  acts  of  colonial  
conquest  and  cultural  repression.  The  historical  context  overwhelmed.  Robbed  
of  power,  desperate  for  release  and  absolution,  the  penitents  were  broken  
people,  morally  annihilated.  Behind  the  spontaneous  happening  was  a  modern  
history,  a  dark  past,  a  veritable  clash  of  civilisations.  And  behind  its  recurrences,  
a  failure  to  find  the  right  words,  to  match  affect  to  object.  One  long  search  for  the  
right  note.  
Ordinary  Affects  resists  evaluation  as  anthropology.  Too  slippery  to  grasp  
in  any  critical  frame  (those  tentacles!),  it  can  only  be  appreciated  as  
performance,  an  enactment  of  what  it  purports  to  describe.  Among  
anthropologists  it  figures  as  an  exemplar  of  ‘the  turn  to  affect’,  a  model  for  the  
new  paradigm;  but  other,  more  conventional  works  have  a  better  claim.  
Consider,  for  example,  Yael  Navaro-­‐Yashin’s  The  Make-­‐Believe  Space  (2012),  a  
study  with  a  solid  foundation  in  fieldwork  and  something  interesting  to  say.  In  
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assessing  what  the  ‘turn  to  affect’  can  offer  anthropologists,  especially  those  with  
an  interest  in  emotion,  Navaro-­‐Yashin  merits  close  attention.2  
Affect and Ethnography 
The  Make-­‐Believe  Space  has  many  merits.  It  makes  original  contributions  to  our  
understanding  of  the  modern  state.  It  says  important  things  about  war,  
historicity,  and  nationalism.  It  shows  us  what  binds  people  to  ideology.  My  
interest,  however,  is  in  the  book’s  concern  with  what  the  author  calls  ‘affective  
geography’;  in  particular,  the  ‘affective  geography’  of  the  Turkish  Republic  of  
Northern  Cyprus  (TRNC),  a  statelet  created  in  1974  by  the  ethnic  cleansing  of  
Greek-­‐Cypriots  from  the  north  of  the  island  (with  a  symmetrical  expulsion  of  
Turkish-­‐Cypriots  from  the  south).  The  resulting  division,  secured  by  Turkish  
military  occupation,  is  unrecognized  by  the  UN  and  scarcely  legitimate  in  the  
eyes  of  its  citizens  who  guiltily  conserve,  trade,  or  use  the  homes  and  personal  
effects  of  their  former  neighbours  and  counterparts  as  ‘loot’.  The  author’s  central  
question,  stated  in  an  earlier  publication,  is  ‘What  affect  does  such  an  exchanged  
and  appropriated  environment  discharge?’  (Navaro-­‐Yashin  2009:  4).  
The  wish  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  violence  while  recognizing  them  as  
illegitimate,  the  mix  of  bad  feeling  and  bad  faith,  we  might  characterize  as  ‘guilt’.  
But  that  concept  does  not  explicitly  figure  in  the  testimonies  the  author  collected.  
Decades  of  propaganda  and  legislation  affirming  rights  to  the  spoils  of  war  have  
created  an  uneasy  acceptance  of  the  status  quo.  Redrawn  maps  paper  over  
                                                            
2  A  recent  collection  in  the  same  vein,  Affective  States  (Laszczkowski  &  
Reeves  2017),  takes  Navaro-­‐Yashin,  Stewart,  and  other  affect  theorists  
mentioned  above  as  its  inspiration.  
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memory  and  sentiment.  On  the  TRNC  side  of  the  partition,  a  derelict  zone  strewn  
with  rusted  vehicles  and  abandoned  household  paraphernalia  leaves  the  border  
a  permanent  scar  of  war,  obsessively  fingered  yet  thrust  out  of  mind.  The  ruined  
landscape  makes  people  ‘melancholic’.  It  reminds  them  of  bad  things  done  to  
them  and  done  by  them.  And  it  makes  them  reflect  on  their  altered  identity:  
formerly  Cypriots  with  a  complex  heritage;  now  simplified  Turkish-­‐Cypriots  
categorically  opposed  to  Greek-­‐Cypriots.  The  old  city  walls,  pockmarked  with  
bullets,  remind  them  they  live  in  a  prison,  a  frozen  construct  of  the  past.  The  
better  off  have  moved  to  new  suburbs,  leaving  the  old  town  to  poorer  settlers.  
But  they  are  a  haunted  people:  haunted  by  the  past,  by  the  people  they  have  
displaced,  by  their  buried  selves.  As  Navaro-­‐Yashin  tells  it,  the  landscape  itself  is  
haunted,  as  are  the  looted  objects,  a  mute  testimony  of  their  former  owners.  
All  this  is  fertile  terrain  for  an  exploration  of  emotion,  taken  in  the  
broadest  possible  sense.  But  the  author  eschews  that  path,  seeing  emotion  in  the  
narrow  terms  defined  by  biology  or  social  constructionism  or  the  inner  quest  of  
psychoanalysis,  none  of  which  will  do.  And  if  emotions  were  confined  to  
discourse,  the  psyche,  or  visceral  feedback  to  the  brain  she  would  be  right.  But  as  
we  have  seen  they  are  much  more.  They  connect,  respond,  communicate,  
apprehend,  appraise,  model,  and  project.  At  any  rate,  the  range  of  activities  that  
we  group  by  the  term  ‘emotion’  includes  those  functions.  All  of  which  can  be  
captured  through  such  writing  strategies  as  narrative,  dialogue,  and  what  in  
fictional  terms  would  be  called  dramatization  –  the  depiction  of  people  in  their  
everyday  exchanges,  their  dilemmas  and  predicaments.  Adequately  presented,  
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an  ethnographic  account  grounded  in  experience  and  responsive  to  life  yields  
what  the  old  conceptual  alleys  shut  out.  
So  what  does  the  author  propose  instead?  First,  a  focus  on  objects  –  the  
ruins  of  old  buildings,  the  debris  of  war,  the  materiality  of  things  that  resist  
interpretation.  Navaro-­‐Yashin  picks  over  the  ruins  and  asks  denizens  what  it  is  
like  to  live  among  them.  She  pores  over  maps  and  charts,  palimpsests  on  which  
geography  and  history  are  rewritten.  She  tours  private  collections  of  war  loot  –  
garage-­‐museums  of  dusty  finds  that  leave  visitors  perplexed,  unsure  what  to  feel.  
Second,  a  focus  on  space:  enclosure,  occupation,  partition,  Lebensraum  
for  people  who  don’t  belong  among  other  people’s  belongings.  The  friction  
interlopers  encounter,  their  sense  of  not  fitting,  she  calls  ‘irritability’,  and  makes  
this  stand  for  ‘a  dis-­‐resonating  [sic]  feeling  produced  by  environments  that  
harbor  phantoms’.  Irritability  is  ‘representative  of  the  affects  invoked  by  the  
environment’  (20).  
Third,  an  interest  in  the  tools  of  domination  –  maps,  plans,  offices,  title  
deeds  –  whatever  imposes  the  order  of  things  and  generates  affect.  Documents  
‘transmit  specific  kinds  of  energy  among  their  users’;  they  are  ‘affectively  
charged  phenomena’  (125);  ‘they  produce  and  effect  affect’  (126).  What  kinds  of  
affect?  What  count  as  examples?  ‘Irony,  cynicism,  familiar  contempt,  and  wit’  
(126),  but  also  fear,  apathy,  and  dissatisfaction.  These  are  recognizable  human  
responses,  suggesting  an  overlap  between  the  concepts  of  affect  and  emotion.  
But  Navaro-­‐Yashin  takes  a  further  step.  ‘We  can  conceive  of  institutions  as  
having  nerves  or  tempers  or,  alternatively,  as  having  calming  and  quieting  effects  
…  Here  I  study  administration  as  animated,  as  having  its  own  charge’  (33).  
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As  can  be  seen  from  these  examples,  affect  is  given  varied  denotations.  
Sometimes  undefined  and  undifferentiated,  as  in  ‘This  book  is  about  the  affect  
that  is  discharged  by  a  postwar  environment’  (17),  affect  is  also  equated  with  a  
‘force’  or  ‘energy’  given  off  by  objects,  spaces,  and  institutions,  something  that  
‘exceeds’  human  signification  but  is  nevertheless  felt.  ‘It  is  this  excess,  explored  
through  the  terms  of  affect,  that  I  study  ethnographically  in  this  book’  (18).  The  
terminology  echoes  Stewart  (who  is  quoted),  as  well  as  Deleuze  and  Massumi.  
But  affect  is  also  differentiated  and  pluralized,  and  (in  my  terms)  equivalent  to  
emotion,  mood,  impulse,  feeling,  sentiment,  even  disposition  or  expressive  act  –  
as  in  the  awkward  formula:  ‘an  affect  of  thanksgiving  to  Turkey,  as  well  as  one  of  
independence’  (93).  Sometimes  the  equivalence  is  explicit,  undermining  claims  
to  originality.  ‘Administration,  I  argue,  evokes  a  complex  spectrum  of  affect.  In  
northern  Cyprus,  this  is  experienced  through  seemingly  opposed  emotions:  
Turkish-­‐Cypriots  feel  desire  for  and  apathy  toward  their  state  administration  at  
the  same  time  …  This  is  a  study  of  affective  civil  service  or  of  bureaucracy  as  an  
emotive  domain’  (82).  A  different  kind  of  ethnographic  approach  might  usefully  
distinguish  between  a  reigning  office  ethos,  personal  dispositions,  background  
moods,  and  fleeting  emotional  episodes.  But  no  interactional  episodes  are  
presented  through  which  such  distinctions  could  be  explored.  We  are  stuck  with  
the  single  word  ‘affect’  as,  variously,  the  precursor,  elicitor,  vehicle,  or  equivalent  
of  emotion;  or  else  as  something  undefined  and  altogether  different.  
What,  then,  are  the  ‘terms  of  affect’?  Affect  becomes  ‘qualified’  through  
human  interaction  with  the  environment;  which  is  presumably  why  affects  
(plural)  can  be  labelled  and  distinguished  with  familiar  emotion  words  like  
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‘anxiety’  and  ‘sadness’  that  respond  to  varying  context,  as  well  as  with  words  for  
dispositions  or  attitudes  such  as  ‘irony’  and  ‘cynicism’,  or  affective  tendencies  
like  ‘irritability’  –  to  use  a  more  conventional  terminology.  Navaro-­‐Yashin  only  
develops  the  notion  of  ‘qualification’  (via  a  discussion  of  Tarde)  at  the  end  the  
book,  and  links  it  obscurely  to  metaphor;  but  it  serves  to  recover  areas  of  
emotion  and  subjectivity  that  her  favoured  theorists  exclude.  What  the  left  hand  
takes  away,  the  right  hand  gives  back.  
Nonetheless,  we  are  very  far  from  what  an  anthropology  of  emotion  –  or  
an  emotionally-­‐alive  anthropology  –  would  require.  We  do  not  see  people  
interacting  with  one  another,  quarrelling,  at  play,  in  anger  or  in  love;  nor  do  we  
know  what  they  are  like  or  how  they  act.  Despite  mention  of  an  ‘emotive  domain’  
–  whatever  that  may  be  –  there  are  no  accounts  of  emotional  scenes  among  
people.  It  remains  unclear  whether  this  is  because  (1)  the  author’s  interest  was  
limited  to  environment–person  interactions  or  (2)  affect  is  supposed  mainly  to  
occur  in  impersonal  transactions  (though,  following  the  cultural  theorist  Teresa  
Brennan,  she  also  speaks  of  ‘transmission  of  affect’  between  persons).  At  any  
rate,  the  effect  of  the  presentational  focus  is  to  animate  objects  and  de-­‐animate  
persons,  who  –  except  when  they  speak  –  become  objects  in  the  field  like  any  
other.  Among  believers,  this  would  not  necessarily  be  counted  as  a  criticism,  
though  from  my  point  of  view  it  highlights  a  limitation.  Recourse  to  Actor  
Network  Theory,  one  of  the  author’s  inspirations,  justifies  the  exclusion  of  a  vast  
range  of  experience  and  observations  that  might  have  cast  a  different  light  on  the  
genuinely  interesting  problem  she  uncovers,  namely,  a  deep  ambivalence  about  
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identity,  biography,  place,  history,  and  personal  relations  in  the  wake  of  
partition.  
A  glance  back  at  my  summary  of  Russell’s  ‘psychological  constructionist’  
discussion  of  affect  reveals  some  superficial  similarities,  which  both  authors  
would  probably  find  surprising,  coming  at  the  problem,  as  they  do,  from  opposite  
directions.  In  Russell’s  theory,  undifferentiated  ‘core  affect’  (analogous  to  
Navaro-­‐Yashin’s  ‘energy’)  becomes  qualified  through  a  process  of  attribution  in  
response  to  the  ‘affective  quality’  of  things,  thoughts,  and  events.  Core  affect  is  
distinguished  from  full-­‐blown  emotions  (or  ‘meta-­‐emotions’)  of  the  kind  we  call  
‘anger’,  and  it  may  influence  behaviour  out  of  consciousness.  Like  many  emotion  
theorists  these  days,  Russell  gives  an  interactional  (or  ‘relational’,  in  Navaro-­‐
Yashin’s  term)  account  of  affective  states  in  which  the  environment,  including  
other  people,  forms  a  necessary  part  of  the  account.  The  major  differences  from  
the  alternative  approach  discussed  here  are  in  the  psychological  emphasis,  the  
greater  analytical  precision,  and  the  experimental  methodology.  As  I  say,  the  
similarities  are  superficial,  even  coincidental;  but  since  we  are  dealing  with  a  
shared  term  –  a  term  trending  among  social  scientists  and  cultural  theorists  –  it  
is  good  to  know  what’s  what,  and  what  isn’t.  
My  chief  concern,  however,  is  to  road  test  the  affect  concept.  How  does  it  
work  in  the  field?  Does  it  open  up  new  ground?  Does  it  overlap  with  ‘emotion’  or  
have  nothing  to  do  with  it?  Does  it  require  a  different  approach  to  fieldwork?  Is  
the  ‘turn  to  affect’  a  wrong  turn,  a  chimera?  Given  an  expertise  and  patience  I  
lack,  it  would  be  possible  to  construct  a  genealogy  of  the  concept  –  something  
that  Leys  (2011)  has  attempted  with  some  success.  The  patient  reader  would  be  
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taken  on  the  trail  of  Chinese  whispers  through  Spinoza,  Deleuze,  Massumi  (a  
Deleuze  exponent),  and  Massumi’s  followers.  Other  branches  of  the  genealogy  
would  lead  back  through  cultural  critics  like  Sedgwick  to  the  scientist  Tomkins,  
whose  psycho-­‐biological  account  of  emotion  figured  as  a  minor  influence  in  an  
earlier  period  of  anthropology  (Chapter  4).  
But  the  test  of  a  tool  is  not  whether  it  looks  good  on  the  drawing  board  or  
comes  with  the  right  credentials  but  whether  it  works.  If  a  new  concept  turns  out  
to  be  ineffective  in  the  field,  better  discard  it  and  get  new  tools,  or  do  better  with  
the  old  ones.  Navaro-­‐Yashin’s  book  is  extremely  useful  in  this  respect.  It  sets  out  
its  terms  and  conditions  with  admirable  clarity,  in  contrast  to  some  of  the  cited  
theorists,  and  it  provides  us  with  enough  context  to  form  a  judgment.  
Navaro-­‐Yashin’s  approach  to  what  she  calls  ‘her  material’  is  emphatically  
theory-­‐driven  and,  in  a  way  common  with  much  recent  ethnography,  only  
loosely  grounded.  Her  interpretations  are  suggested  as  much  by  her  reading  as  
by  what  her  ‘informants’  say  and  do.  (Use  of  the  old  distancing  term  ‘informant’  
is  revealing:  there  is  little  intimacy  between  ethnographer  and  subjects;  many  of  
the  informants  are  anonymous  and  generic:  an  old  woman,  a  Turkish  settler,  a  
government  official,  a  Turkish-­‐Cypriot.)  
Theory-­‐driven,  how?  ‘Bataille’s  work  might  assist  us  in  studying  the  
energy  discharged  by  ruins  and  rubbish’  (150).  Or:  ‘Through  Kristeva,  I  am  able  
to  consider  what  the  ruins,  the  rubbish,  and  the  war  remains  in  northern  Cyprus  
stand  for  in  the  Turkish-­‐Cypriots’  subjective  and  internal  psychical  mechanisms’  
(150).  Each  static  scene  is  viewed  through  a  different  theoretical  lens  –  now  
Kristeva,  now  Benjamin,  now  Derrida,  Deleuze,  Guattari,  Agamben,  Brennan,  
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Bataille,  Latour,  Butler,  Freud,  Thrift,  Tarde.  And  with  the  same  objective:  Does  
‘my  ethnographic  material’  fit  the  theory  (or  vice  versa)?  Would  another  theory  
work  better?  Can  one  have  both,  some,  all?  Shifted  this  way  and  that,  the  
‘ethnographic  material’  only  comes  into  focus  through  a  specified  optic.  It  does  
not  live,  but  is  inertly  subjected  to  varied  ‘readings’;  and  where  the  material  
challenges,  through  not  fitting,  it  is  only  to  provoke  some  new  compromise  
‘reading’  or  triangulation.  Ethnography  made  subordinate  to  theoretical  
positioning.  
Balancing  Deleuze/Guattari  with  Benjamin  requires  nimble  footwork:    
Yet  I  prefer  to  describe  my  ethnographic  material  –  these  prickly  plants  and  
wastelands  –  in  terms  of  ruins,  shards,  rubble,  and  debris  (à  la  Walter  Benjamin’s  
imagination)  rather  than  the  [Deleuzian]  rhizome  …  How  would  affect  be  
theorized  were  we  to  work  with  the  metaphor  of  the  ruin  rather  than  the  
rhizome?  (170–171)    
How  indeed?  How  to  pick  your  way  among  ruins  both  topographical  and  
metaphorical?  ‘Thinking  through  my  material  from  northern  Cyprus’,  the  author  
writes,  now  on  a  different  tack,  ‘I  agree  with  Latour  that  there  is  a  need  to  attend  
to  the  centrality  of  objects  in  the  making  of  politics’  (162).  I  agree,  too,  up  to  a  
point.  Walls,  frontiers,  and  official  forms  have  tangible  effects  that  reinforce,  
sometimes  exceed,  their  purpose.  In  another  old  formula  –  anathema  in  this  
context  –  the  medium  is  the  message.  Who  (of  a  certain  age)  has  not  shuddered  
at  the  telegram,  unopened  in  its  blue  envelope?  Or  winced  at  the  dentist’s  
buzzer?  Yet  the  effects  of  material  things  depend  greatly  on  their  non-­‐material  
aspects  –  what  the  documents  say,  how  the  place-­‐names  signify,  how  the  frontier  
separates,  what  the  relics  recall  –  and  would  seem  logically  to  require  human  
agency,  a  human  context  of  invention  and  use.  Emotions  are  not  conceivable  
without  people  to  experience  them;  and  affect  (new  style),  if  it  has  any  
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connection  to  affective  states  (old  style)  needs  people  too.  In  an  oft-­‐quoted  
declaration,  the  high  priest  of  affect  theory  rejects  any  such  link:  ‘emotion  and  
affect  –  if  affect  is  intensity  –  follow  different  logics  and  pertain  to  different  
orders’  (Massumi  2002:  27).  Yet  even  Spinoza,  whose  word  is  God  in  these  
matters,  lists  among  ‘affects’  such  recognizable  emotions  as  joy,  hatred,  love,  
envy  and  fear  –  and  goes  on  to  explore  their  logical  structures,  explaining  how  
the  ‘passive  affects’  that  lower  our  spirits  may  be  mastered  through  reason.  
Which  is  why  he  is  sometimes  claimed  as  successor  to  the  Stoics  and  precursor  
to  cognitive  theorists  of  emotion  –  at  the  opposite  pole  from  contemporary  affect  
theory  (Nussbaum  2001,  Solomon  2008).3  
Let  us  accept  that  there  are  other  takes  on  ‘affect’,  alternative  uses  of  the  
word  in  quite  different  systems  of  thought  that  include  such  acceptations  as  
‘capacity  to  affect  or  be  affected’,  ‘potential’,  and  ‘becoming’  (though  it  is  not  
clear  whether  ‘affect’  is  defined  as  these  concepts  or  just  related  to  them).  Let  us  
suppose,  however,  that  despite  the  disavowals  of  hardliners,  this  other  kind  of  
affect,  as  it  concerns  us  ethnographically,  is  connected  with  emotional  
phenomena.  Navaro-­‐Yashin,  citing  geographer  Nigel  Thrift,  thinks  so,  even  if  she  
                                                            
3  It  is  possible  that  the  difference  senses  of  ‘affect’,  and  a  source  of  
confusion,  derive  from  contrasting  senses  of  Spinoza’s  Latin  equivalents,  as  
mediated  through  later  interpreters.  In  Spinoza’s  ontology  affectio  (‘affection’)  
refers  to  ‘modes  of  substance’  or  the  ‘modifications  of  bodies’.  Affectus  (‘affect’),  
a  term  he  uses  much  more  frequently,  refers  to  ‘affections  [i.e.  modifications]  of  
the  body  which  diminish  or  increase  the  power  of  the  body  (affects  of  the  body)  
and  the  ideas  of  such  affections  (affects  of  the  mind)’  (van  Bunge  et  al.  2011,  s.v.  
affectio,  affectus).  This  is  close  to  Frijda’s  notion  of  ‘action  readiness’.  Or  
compare  Calhoun  &  Solomon’s  (1984:  71)  cognitive  interpretation:  ‘Like  the  
Stoics,  [Spinoza]  viewed  emotions  as  a  species  of  thoughts,  albeit  misguided  
thoughts.’  
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wants  to  have  it  both  ways:  ‘Affect  does  refer,  broadly,  to  an  emotive  domain,  but  
its  scope  goes  far  beyond  that  of  human  subjectivity  or  the  self’  (167).  Following  
Latour,  Navaro-­‐Yashin  wishes  to  ‘redistrib[ute]  subjective  quality  outside’  (167,  
original  emphasis).  Objects,  on  this  view,  can  be  said  to  ‘discharge  affect’;  
likewise,  affect  ‘can  be  studied  in  sites  and  spaces  beyond  the  scope  of  the  human  
subject,  her  subjectivity,  or  her  psyche’  (168).  
In  my  world  –  the  place  where  you  and  I  meet  –  things  need  us  to  be  able  
to  generate  affect.  They  can’t  do  it  on  their  own.  At  least,  no  one  is  explicitly  
arguing  that  objects  discharge  affects  among  themselves,  green  walls  making  red  
walls  sad,  rusting  cars  feeling  sorry  for  themselves.  Yet  to  distribute  affect  (as  it  
concerns  the  ‘emotive  domain’)  among  material  objects  one  would  need  to  make  
such  a  claim,  or  at  least  attribute  it  to  others.  In  fact,  Navaro-­‐Yashin’s  informants  
resist  such  projections.  They  are  quite  clear  in  talking  about  their  feelings  of  
unease  as  interior,  using  the  term  maraz  for  ‘a  state  of  mental  depression,  deep  
and  inescapable  sadness  and  unease’,  an  ‘inner  lack  of  calm’  (161),  in  contrast  to  
the  author  who  sees  ‘this  melancholy  not  only  as  an  expression  of  the  inner  
worlds  of  my  informants,  but  also  as  the  mark  of  the  energy  (or  affect,  as  I  am  
calling  it)  discharged  on  them  by  the  dwellings  and  environments  they  have  now  
lived  in  for  decades’  (161).  
We  need  not  take  people  at  their  word,  of  course.  It  is  hard  to  put  feelings  
into  words,  hard  sometimes  to  know  what  you  are  feeling,  or  why.  And  when  you  
try,  there  is  not  much  difference  semantically  between  saying  ‘I  feel  bad  inside  
prison  walls’  and  ‘prison  makes  me  feel  bad’,  unless  you  attribute  malice  to  the  
brickwork.  But  the  analytical  leap  to  an  animate  geography  –  whether  or  not  
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Cypriots  think  in  such  terms  –  is  not  warranted  by  the  evidence.  There  is  a  malice  
in  electrified  fences  and  bristling  walls,  but  only  imaginatively.  
The  anthropological  question  –  do  Cypriots  experience  the  landscape  in  
the  way  the  ethnographer  does,  fresh  to  the  scene?  –  requires  a  fuller  answer  
than  Navaro-­‐Yashin  is  able  to  give.  She  does  pretty  well  in  conveying  the  
desolation,  but  can  we  tell  their  experiences  from  hers?  ‘The  space  through  
which  we  walked  exuded  a  melancholy  that  I  could  feel  intensely  …  the  
atmosphere  discharged  a  feeling  of  the  uncanny,  a  strange  feeling  derived,  in  this  
instance,  out  of  a  sense  of  impropriety,  haunting,  or  an  act  of  violation.’  (166–
167)  When  informants’  testimonies  are  quoted,  they  do  not  always  support  the  
‘reading’  placed  on  them.  An  old  Turkish-­‐Cypriot  woman,  asked  how  she  felt  
about  living  among  ruins,  says:  ‘No,  I  don’t  feel  bad  seeing  them.  I  don’t  notice.  
We  got  used  to  these  ruins.’  (155)  The  author  comments:  ‘perhaps  due  to  this  
involvement  [of  her  family  in  the  making  of  the  ruins],  the  affect  generated  by  
these  ruins,  which  appeared  like  a  shocking  war  zone  to  my  eyes  and  senses,  had  
been  repressed  and  abjected  over  the  years.’  (155)  The  woman’s  tale  of  initial  
unease,  gradual  familiarization,  and  eventual  indifference  hardly  warrants  the  
conclusion.  An  interpretive  leap  is  required  to  fit  the  findings  to  Kristeva’s  theory  
of  abjection.  
I  have  pursued  the  argument  of  The  Make-­‐Believe  Space  to  try  to  put  my  
finger  on  where  exactly  in  the  economy  of  affect  the  non-­‐emotional  and  non-­‐
human  part  company  with  the  emotional  and  human  (the  ‘emotive  domain’).  The  
strong  claim  is  that  objects  ‘exude’  or  ‘discharge’  affect,  independently  of  human  
agency  (or  presence?)  and  ‘beyond  the  scope  of  the  human  subject’.  This  seems  
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difficult  to  substantiate.  The  weak  claim,  to  which  Navaro-­‐Yashin  retreats,  is  that  
‘neither  the  ruin  in  my  ethnography  nor  the  people  who  live  around  it  are  
affective  on  their  own  or  in  their  own  right;  rather  they  produce  and  transmit  
affect  relationally’  (172;  author’s  italics).  It  is  possible  that,  by  ‘relationally’,  the  
author  means  something  like  the  bare  ‘associations’  that  arise  between  ‘actants’  
in  Actor  Network  Theory  (Latour  2005),  i.e.  connection  without  presumption  of  
a  social  relation.  But  more  is  explicitly  entailed,  including  ‘language  and  
subjectivity’.  In  which  case,  the  ‘relational’  claim  is  not  very  different  from  what  
emotion  theorists  have  long  argued.  See,  for  example,  Frijda  (1986)  on  appraisal,  
Russell  (2006)  on  ‘affective  quality’,  Burkitt  (2014)  on  relational  contexts,  or  
Parkinson,  Fischer  and  Manstead,  who  write:  ‘emotions  are  ways  of  aligning  and  
realigning  interpersonal  and  intergroup  relations’.  (2005:  235)  When  Navaro-­‐
Yashin  concludes:  ‘my  material  calls  for  a  conceptual  merging  of  affect  and  
subjectivity’  (172),  you  have  to  wonder  why  they  needed  to  be  pulled  apart.  
An  object-­‐oriented  ethnography  certainly  offers  a  novel,  if  tightly  
cropped,  perspective;  but  ‘affect’,  in  the  revamped  sense,  casts  a  dim  light.  The  
affect  paradigm  excludes  the  shared  life  that  is  the  strength  of  fieldwork,  the  
possibility  of  human  connection,  and  the  source  of  so  many  anthropological  
insights.  Is  it  perhaps  the  latest  instance  of  that  turning  away  from  ethnographic  
reality  that  facilitates  theory  but  which,  in  the  case  of  emotion,  destroys  its  
object?  When  I  read  Thrift’s  assertion  that  affect  theory  ‘cleaves  to  an  “inhuman”  
or  “transhuman”  framework  in  which  individuals  are  generally  understood  as  
effects  of  the  events  to  which  their  body  parts  (broadly  understood)  respond  and  
in  which  they  participate’  (2004:  60),  I  concede  that  –  marionette  shows  aside  –    
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this  might  well  describe  certain  Melanesian  thought-­‐worlds  (in  an  essay  on  
urban  affects,  very  much  not  his  point),  but  it  offers  little  to  the  man  or  woman  in  
the  field;  in  fact,  it  makes  the  deep  engagement  of  fieldwork  inconceivable.  
Clifford  Geertz  once  contrasted  exact  scientific  accounts  with  immersive  
interpretive  ones  as  ‘experience-­‐distant’  versus  ‘experience-­‐near’.  Without  being  
scientific,  much  less  exact,  it  is  clear  where  on  the  scale  affect  theory  lies.  
Conclusion 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’ 
     ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.’  
     ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—that’s all.’  
Lewis Carroll. Through the looking glass.  
For  affect  theorists,  emotions  are  putative  properties  of  individual  subjects,  
interior  states  that  are  expressible  and  available  to  consciousness.  In  an  obsolete,  
cosily  human  world,  emotions  are  experienced  and  shared  by  people.  Affect  
theory,  in  contrast,  belongs  to  that  chilly  poststructuralist  world  from  which  the  
human  subject  has  been  banished.  
The  affect/emotion  divide,  already  wide  enough  in  some  disciplines  to  
suggest  a  paradigm  shift  (though  scarcely  registered  in  analytic  philosophy  or  
the  affective  sciences),  does  not,  however,  map  neatly  onto  established  and  
emerging  ways  of  doing  anthropology.  Why?  Because  nowhere  has  the  
conventional  conception  of  emotion  been  more  criticized.  Over  a  period  of  
twenty  or  thirty  years,  anthropologists  have  chipped  away  at  the  model,  
questioning  the  boundedness  and  fixity  of  ‘the  person’,  showing  how  emotions  
are  mediated  through  discourse,  at  once  framing  encounters  and  pervading  
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politics.  In  deconstructing  Western  concepts  of  emotion  and  exploring  modes  of  
relation  in  other  cultures,  anthropologists  have  already  encroached  on  the  
territory  annexed  by  ‘affect’  in  other  disciplines.  We  have,  in  several  senses,  been  
there.  And  this  deep  ethnographic  engagement  with  other  modes  of  being  gives  
us  a  practical  and  comparative  perspective  on  other  lifeworlds  that  affect  theory  
cannot  match.  Can  we  therefore  do  without  ‘affect’?  
If  the  Alice-­‐like  disagreement  over  what  ‘affect’  designates  and  how  it  
might  be  made  useful  to  anthropology  is  intriguing,  its  applications  have  so  far  
not  been  encouraging.  They  mostly  signal  a  retreat  from  ethnographic  precision  
and  a  loss  of  analytic  power.  Unresolved  problems  with  constructionist,  
evolutionist,  and  phenomenological  approaches  to  emotion  have  created  a  
hunger  for  a  theoretical  messiah.  But  as  the  new  paradigm  stubbornly  refuses  to  
take  shape  a  definitional  fog  has  settled  over  the  ethnographic  terrain,  blurring  
outlines,  reducing  vision,  turning  everything  grey.  In  the  new  climate,  the  people  
we  struggle  to  understand  across  cultural  divides  seem  remoter  than  ever.  At  
risk  is  anthropology’s  greatest  asset:  news  from  the  frontline,  the  field  in  all  its  
unsettling  strangeness,  its  spikiness  and  vigour.  
